The paper considers the communication complexity (measured in bits or real numbers) of Nash implementation of social choice rules. A key distinction is whether we restrict attention to the traditional one-stage mechanisms or allow multi-stage mechanisms. For one-stage mechanisms, the paper shows that for a large and important subclass of monotonic choice rules -called "Intersection Monotonic" -that also satisfy "the no veto power" condition and have N 3 agents, the total message space size required for one-stage Nash implementation only slightly exceeds that needed for "veri…cation"(with honest agents who are privately informed about their preferences).
Introduction
This paper considers the problem of Nash implementation of social choice rules -i.e., designing a mechanism whose set of Nash equilibria equals the set of socially desirable alternatives. As shown by Maskin [14] , any Nash implementable choice rule must satisfy the property of "monotonicity," which, together with the "No Veto Power" (NVP) property, also proves su¢ cient for Nash implementation with N 3 agents. The su¢ ciency part is shown by constructing a "canonical"mechanism to implement the choice rule. The canonical mechanism has been criticized for its enormous communication burden: Indeed, it requires each agent to describe the preferences of all the agents (along with an integer), which is impractical in most settings. A number of papers have demonstrated that Nash implementation can be achieved with simpler mechanisms, even much simpler in some special settings. [9, 13, 15, 20, 17, 3, 23, 25, 24, 5, 21, 4] . However, these papers have not considered the problem of minimizing the communication cost of Nash implementation, except in several special settings (such as Pareto, Walrasian, or Lindahl correspondences in classical economies with convex preferences).
1;2
The present paper o¤ers two contributions to this literature: (1) a mechanism for onestage Nash implementation at a close to minimal possible communication cost, and (2) a three-stage mechanism for Nash implementation with a drastically lower communication cost. The construction works not for all implementable choice rules, but for a large class of them (which includes all speci…c monotonic choice rules examined previously). Our approach follows the program suggested by Williams [26] , which relates the message space needed for 1 Note that if the agents were honest, then under symmetric information we could simply ask one agent to report a socially desirable outcome, which would entail a low communication cost. Any additional communication cost of Nash implementation can thus be interpreted as the "communication cost of sel…shness."
Fadel and Segal [7] examine the communication cost of sel…shness for (partial) Bayesian-Nash and ex post implementation. 2 The canonical mechanism has also been criticized for its use of integer or modulo games to eliminate undesirable equilibrium outcomes. (see, e.g., [12] ). While in a number of settings such tricks can be avoided, in this paper we do not examine this issue, for the communication cost of modulo games is fairly low.
Nash implementation to that needed for verifying the desirability of an alternative when agents know their preferences privately but can be trusted to report honestly. At …rst glance, the two problems appear quite di¤erent: under Nash implementation, sel…sh agents with symmetric information send messages, while under veri…cation, honest agents with private information respond to a message announced by a hypothetical omniscient oracle.
Yet, as observed in [16] and [26] , Nash implementation can be viewed a special case of veri…cation, since each agent's acceptance of (lack of pro…table deviations from) a candidate Nash equilibrium depends only on his own preferences. This observation implies that the communication cost of Nash implementation is bounded below by that of veri…cation. 3 This paper further exploits the relation between Nash implementation and veri…cation, using concepts and results developed in Segal [22] . The latter paper focuses on a large and important subclass of monotonic choice rules, called "Intersection Monotonic" (IM), and
shows that such rules are veri…ed with minimal communication by announcing a "minimally informative verifying budget equilibrium." Such an equilibrium describes a proposed alternative and o¤ers each agent a budget set -an appropriately restricted subset of alternatives.
The fact that the proposed equilibrium is indeed an equilibrium in a given state -i.e., that each agent cannot improve upon the proposed alternative within his budget set -must verify the social desirability of the proposed alternative in this state. The budget sets must be chosen carefully: on the one hand, they must be large enough for the equilibrium to achieve veri…cation; on the other hand, they must not be too large so that the equilibrium does not reveal more than necessary about the agents'preferences. [22] gives an algorithm for constructing such "minimally informative verifying budget equilibria" for any given IM choice rule.
To apply these ideas to Nash implementation, observe that a Nash equilibrium of a mechanism describes for each agent a "budget set" consisting of the alternatives he could achieve by unilateral deviations, and that the described budget equilibrium must verify that the alternative is socially desirable. The only di¤erence from the veri…cation scenario is that an agent's budget set must be described by the other agents rather than by the hypothetical 3 Williams [26] does not attempt a reverse comparison of the communication costs of implementation and veri…cation: while he "embeds" a veri…cation protocol into an implementation mechanism under some conditions, he admits that "the strategy space in our construction is rather large, relative to the size of the omniscient oracle. This observation leads us to construct a Nash implementation mechanism with small strategy spaces, in which exactly two agents -say, agents 1 and 2 -describe a minimally informative budget equilibrium verifying a choice rule. In addition, each agent announces an alternative and an integer between 1 and N . When all agents the agree on an alternative and agents 1 and 2 also agree on a budget equilibrium supporting it, the alternative is implemented. When one agent deviates from such unanimous agreement and proposes another alternative, his proposal is implemented if and only if it lies in his budget set as described by another agent. Thus, unanimous agreement is a Nash equilibrium in a given state if and only if agents 1 and 2 announce a budget equilibrium in this state, and since only budget equilibria that verify the choice rule can be announced, unanimous-agreement Nash equilibria yield desirable alternatives. To ensure that non-unanimous Nash equilibria do not yield any undesirable alternatives, we use the integers announced by the agents to induce a "modulo game" when more than one agent disagrees with others, and make use of the NVP property, just as it is done in the canonical mechanism. Thus we obtain the following mechanism:
The mechanism implements any choice rule that is IM and NVP with N 3 agents. The total size of the agents' strategy spaces in the mechanism is twice the minimal message space size needed for veri…cation (which consists of minimally informative verifying budget equilibria), plus N times the size of the alternative space, plus N dlog 2 N e bits. 5 The proposed mechanism is particularly useful in conjunction with Segal's [22] algorithm for constructing minimally informative verifying budget equilibria. When using such budget equilibria, Mechanism 1 gives us a "close-to-minimal" Nash implementation mechanism.
In many important settings, this mechanism proves to have a much smaller strategy space than what full description of agents'preferences or even just their lower contour sets at a given alternative would require. For example, this is true for the problem of implementing interior Pareto e¢ cient allocations in the classical convex economies with private and public goods, in which the minimally informative verifying budget equilibria take the familiar form 4 This mechanism can be used both for the "weak" versions of the implementation and veri…cation problems, in which it su¢ ces to implement/verify a nonemtpy subset of desirable outcomes in any given state, and for the "full" version, in which all desirable outcomes must be implementable/veri…able. 5 dze denotes the smallest integer greater than or equal to z.
of Walrasian and Lindahl equilibria, respectively [22] . 6 The second observation of the paper is that while the total size of strategy spaces describes Without the bene…t of Segal's [22] budget-equilibrium characterization of veri…cation of IM choice rules, these works could not tightly relate the communication requirements of Nash implementation to that of veri…cation.
[15] did not formalize the problem of minimizing communication, while [10] considered communication in equilibrium, rather than the total size of message spaces (which must include many message pro…les that are are never sent in equilibrium). Despite these di¤erences, the two constructions are related to our Mechanism 1, as we will point out in greater detail below. 7 This is not a complete description of the mechanism -we also need to make sure that agents' reports about budget sets are consistent with verifying the choice rule, and that in any equilibrium the strategies of di¤erent agents describe the same budget sets. We achieve both goals without raising the communication cost. We also use the modulo game to take care of equilibria that involve one or more challenges. We conclude with a philosophical discussion. While current mainstream economic thinking justi…es price mechanisms by the need to provide incentives to sel…sh agents, we showed in [22] that supporting prices (more generally, budget sets, which could be described by personalized nonlinear prices) must be communicated in order to attain many important social goals even if agents are honest but their preference information is private and must be aggregated to …nd a socially desirable outcome. An intuition for this, based on Hayek [8] ,
is that to achieve social goals that are "su¢ ciently congruent"with private goals, communication is minimized by asking individuals to maximize their own preferences within certain "budget sets," which must be carefully outlined to coordinate their choices and attain the social goals.
The analysis of one-stage Nash implementation suggests another possible justi…cation for prices: they must be used to create incentives even when information is symmetric. This justi…cation is not valid, however, once multistage mechanisms are allowed. Multistage Nash mechanisms with symmetric information need not reveal supporting prices in any play, and so can have very low communication complexity. In contrast, multistage mechanisms with private information, even when agents are honest, cannot do any better than veri…cation mechanisms [11, Chapter 2] , and therefore according to [22] must still communicate supporting prices, which bounds below their communication complexity. In brief, once multistage mechanisms are allowed, price revelation becomes unnecessary when information is symmetric (even if agents are sel…sh), but is still necessary when preference information is private (even if agents are honest). Thus, we conclude that price revelation must arise due to the need to aggregate distributed preference information, rather than to the need to create incentives for sel…sh agents.
Setup 2.1 The Social Choice Problem
Let N be a …nite set of agents, and X be a set of social alternatives. (With a slight abuse of notation, the same letter will denote a set and its cardinality when this causes no confusion.) Let P denote the set of all preference relations over set X. The set of agent i's possible preference relations is denoted by R i P. A state is a preference pro…le R = (R 1 ; : : : ; R N ) 2 R 1 : : : R N R, where R is the state space, also called preference domain. The goal is to realize a choice rule, which is a correspondence F : R X. For every state R 2 R, the rule speci…es the set F (R) of "desirable"alternatives in this state.
The following two properties of choice rules, introduced in [14] , play a prominent role in Nash implementation. (We use the standard notation L (x; R i ) = fy 2 X : xR i yg -the lower contour set of agent i's preference relation R i at alternative x 2 X:)
The next two properties are introduced in [22] :
Note that this property implies monotonicity by taking e R to be a singleton. In addition to monotonicity, it it requires, in particular, that if the desirability of alternative x is preserved by making an agent strictly prefer either alternative y or alternative z to x (holding the other preferences …xed), then it should also be preserved by making the agent strictly prefer both y and z to x (assuming all the relevant preference pro…les are feasible). (In fact, IM is characterized by this requirement and monotonicity when R = P N and X is …nite.)
De…nition 4
Choice rule F is a Coalitionally Unblocked (CU) choice rule if there exists a blocking correspondence : X 2 N X for which
Note that CU implies, in particular, that if the desirability of alternative x is preserved by either making agent i strictly prefer either alternative y over x or making agent j strictly prefer alternative z 6 = y over x (holding the other preferences …xed), then it should also be preserved by implementing both of these preference reversals at once (assuming all the relevant preference pro…les are feasible.) (In fact, CU is characterized by this requirement and monotonicity when R = P N and X is …nite.) See [22] for further analysis, which formally establishes that every CU rule is IM, every IM rule is monotonic, and both inclusions are strict. The class of CU rules is still large enough to include all speci…c monotonic rules that have been considered, such as exact or approximate Pareto e¢ ciency, the core, stable matchings, or envy-free rules.
Nash Implementation
In the Nash implementation problem, all agents observe the state of the world, and they play a Nash equilibrium of the mechanism o¤ered to them.
De…nition 5 A mechanism ("game form") G = hM 1 ; :::; M N ; hi describes a strategy space M i for each agent and an outcome function h :
The Nash equilibrium correspondence of the mechanism is given by
Note that we can also allow multistage mechanisms, whose normal form can still be described by mechanism G above. Since Nash equilibrium is de…ned on the normal form, allowing multistage mechanisms does not a¤ect the implementability of choice rules. The usefulness of multistage mechanisms to us will stem from their substantially lower communication costs than their normal-form representations.
Veri…cation
Now we consider the communication problem, in which each agent i observes only his own "type" -in our case, preference relation R i . but can be prescribed to follow an arbitrary strategy, rather than being sel…sh. Furthermore, we focus on a special kind of communication, called "veri…cation" (or "nondeterministic communication" in computer science). In the veri…cation problem, an omniscient oracle knows the true state R and consequently the desirable alternatives. However, he needs to prove to an ignorant outsider that alternative
He does this by publicly announcing a message m 2 M . Each agent i either accepts or rejects the message, doing this on the basis of his own type R i .
The acceptance of message m by all agents must prove to the outsider that alternative x is desirable.
Formally, veri…cation is de…ned as follows:
De…nition 6 A veri…cation protocol is a triple = hM; ; hi, where M is the message space,
: R M is the message correspondence satisfying Privacy Preservation: In addition, note that veri…cation gives a lower bound on the one-stage Nash implementation problem, since any Nash implementation protocol G = hM 1 ; :::; M N ; hi can be viewed as a veri…cation protocol = hM 1 ; :::; M N ; G :hi. Indeed, note that the Nash equilibrium correspondence G by construction satis…es Privacy Preservation:
is the best-response correspondence of agent i, which depends only on this agent's preferences R i . Thus, the oracle can announce a candidate Nash equilibrium strategy pro…le, and each agent accepts the announcement if and only if he cannot …nd a pro…table unilateral deviation from this pro…le.
We will show in this paper that the relation between veri…cation and Nash implementation is quite tight (unlike the relation between veri…cation and communication). Intuitively, this is because in the implementation problem each agent has full information and so can send the oracle's message by himself, as long as he does not have an incentive to misrepresent it.
Measures of Communication Cost
In the case of discrete communication, the communication cost is naturally de…ned as "communication complexity," which is the (worst-case) number of bits needed to encode the messages [11] . 10 In the case of veri…cation, the oracle needs dlog 2 N e bits to encode his message from M . The minimal communication complexity of a veri…cation protocol o¤ers a lower bound on the "communication complexity"without an oracle [11] .
For continuous communication, the communication cost can be naturally de…ned as the "total dimension" of the messages sent. However, for a meaningful concept of dimension, we need to rule out "smuggling" a multidimensional message in a single dimension with a 1-to-1 function such as the inverse Peano function. The economic literature on message space dimension has suggested various topological concepts of dimension that prevent such smuggling. In particular, [22] de…nes the topological dimension of the message space using a topology on messages de…ned based on their "meaning,"i.e., the set of states in which their are sent. For the sake of brevity, we do not repeat the de…nitions of [22] in this paper, and instead use the concept of dimension in its intuitive sense.
These concepts of communication cost can be naturally applied to Nash implementation mechanisms. First consider one-stage mechanisms. In a discrete one-stage mechanism, each agent i needs dlog 2 M i e bits to encode his strategy from M i , and so the total communication complexity of the game can be de…ned as X describing agents'contingent strategies in it requires 1 bit per decision node, and so up to 10 Using bits is merely a normalization, because an elementary message in any …nite alphabet could be coded with a …xed number of bits. What is important for the de…nition is that the coding and the communication protocol can be selected optimally for the problem at hand: if instead agents could only communicate using messages with pre-existing meanings, this might raise the communication cost substantially. 11 Hurwicz and Reiter [10, Subsection 3.9.2] instead consider the "in-equilibrium" communication cost, which only counts message pro…les that can ever arise in equilibrium. Since the message pro…les that never arise in equilibrium must still be allowed to eliminate undesirable Nash equilibria, we do count such messages pro…les, following the spirit of "worst-case" communication cost measures (even if the worst case has probability zero of arising in equilibrium). As we will point out, the in-equilibrium communication cost of mechanisms proposed in this paper will be even lower than the worst-case cost that we de…ne. In contrast, only two numbers are communicated in any play of the mechanism. While these examples are abstract, we will construct examples of similar reduction in the communication complexity of Nash implementation.
Role of Budget Equilibria
A famous economic example of veri…cation is Walrasian equilibrium. The role of the oracle is played by the "Walrasian auctioneer,"who announces the equilibrium prices and allocations.
Each agent accepts the announcement if and only if his announced allocation constitutes his
optimal choice from the budget set given by the announced prices. This concept can be generalized to that of a "budget equilibrium," in which the oracle's message consists of a proposed alternative x 2 X and a budget set B i X for each agent i. Each agent i 2 N accepts message (B 1 ; : : : ; B N ; x) if and only if there is no alternative in his budget set B i that he strictly prefers to the proposed alternative x. (B 1 ; : : : ; B N ; x) is a budget equilibrium in state R 2 R if it is accepted by all agents in this state. Formally, the budget equilibrium correspondence E : R 2 XN X is described as
E satis…es Privacy Preservation because each agent's acceptance depends only on his own preferences.
The oracle's message space M in a budget protocol is a collection of budget equilibria that he is allowed to announce, and the outcome function simply implements the proposed alternative:
Clearly, the space M of budget equilibria used is important for whether the protocol veri…es F . In particular, for the protocol to verify F (either fully or weakly), it must use only budget equilibria of the following kind:
X is a budget equilibrium verifying F if 1 (B 1 ; :::; B N ; x)
However, the message space need not include all the budget equilibria verifying F . In fact, it turns out that for IM choice rules, the size of the message space can be reduced while restricting attention to the following budget equilibria:
De…nition 9 For an IM choice rule F that is de…ned on all R, (B; x) 2 2 XN X is a minimally informative budget equilibrium verifying F if for some R 2 P N ,
In [22] , this concept is not postulated but derived by constructing messages that verify F while revealing minimal information about the state of the world. It is shown that when F is IM, these messages can be characterized as budget equilibrium messages of the form (1). 12 Furthermore, [22] o¤ers an algorithm for constructing these minimally informative budget equilibria for a given social choice problem.
Letting E F be the space of all minimally informative budget equilibria verifying F , the following proposition follows from [22] :
The message space size for fully or weakly verifying an IM choice rule F is minimized with a budget equilibrium protocol whose message space is a subset of E F .
One-Stage Mechanisms
Recall that a Nash implementation protocol can be viewed as a veri…cation protocol. 
Lemma 1
The minimal total size of strategy spaces required for full/weak Nash implementation is at least as high as the minimal size of message space for full/weak veri…cation. 12 In general, the preference pro…le R 2 P N satisfying (1) need not be a feasible state in R. When it is, then it is an "F -minimal states" as de…ned by McKelvey [15] . McKelvey's de…nition applies for general monotonic choice rules. However, if F is not IM, the F -minimal states are not characterized by (1) and do not generate minimally informative messages verifying F (indeed, such messages are no longer equivalent to announcing a supporting budget equilibrium).
We also provide an upper bound for the communication cost of Nash implementation relative to that of veri…cation by starting with a budget equilibrium protocol with message space E 2 XN X and constructing a mechanism in which two agents announce a budget equilibrium from E, so that each agent's budget set is described by another agent.
Mechanism 1:
The In the case of full/weak veri…cation, in any state R 2 R, for any/some x 2 F (R) there exist budget sets B 1 ; : : : ; B N X such that (B 1 ; : : : ; B N ; x) 2 E is a budget equilibrium in state R, hence by Claim 1 any/some x 2 F (R) can arise in a NE of the mechanism. It remains to show that any NE outcome of the mechanism in state R is in F (R), which is done in the following two claims:
Claim 2: Any Case-(a) NE outcome x in a state R 2 R is in F (R).
Proof:
Since each agent i can unilaterally deviate to Case (b-i) to implement any alternative y i 2 B i , for this to be a NE, E must be a budget equilibrium in state R. Now, by the (full or weak) veri…cation assumption, E veri…es F , hence x 2 F (R).
Claim 3: Any Case-(b) or Case-(c) NE outcome x in a state R 2 R is in F (R).
Proof: From any Case-(b) or Case-(c) message pro…le, each agent i except possibly one can deviate to attain any alternative y i 2 X in Case (c) by choosing l i , hence for this message pro…le to be a NE we must have L (x; R i ) = X. By NVP, this implies that
Combining this result with Proposition 1, we see that for an IM choice rule F we can choose the space E to be a minimal subspace of minimally informative budget equilibria needed for weakly/fully verifying F . Thus, using Proposition 2, and examining the size of strategy spaces in Mechanism 1 yields Corollary 1 Suppose choice rule F is IM and NVP, and N 3. Then for discrete communication, using Mechanism 1 we can fully/weakly Nash implement F with a one-stage mechanism whose communication complexity is twice the communication complexity of full/weak veri…cation plus N (dlog 2 Xe + dlog 2 N e) bits. For continuous communication, we can fully/weakly Nash implement F with a one-stage mechanism in which the total dimensionality of the agents'strategy spaces is twice the minimal message space dimension needed for full/weak veri…cation plus N times the dimension of X.
The Corollary gives an upper bound on the communication cost of one-stage Nash implementation that is pretty close to the veri…cation lower bound of Lemma 1. The upper bound can be tightened a bit more in some typical cases. For example, instead of asking each agent to announce the whole social outcome (which might be costly if the number of agents is large), it su¢ ces to have each agent only announce the part of the outcome that his preferences are concerned with (e.g., his own consumption of goods). Also, the duplication of budget set descriptions can be improved upon in some settings, as long as we still ensure that each agent's budget set is described by the other agents'reports. For example, Reichelstein and Reiter [17] show that for Nash implementation of Walrasian allocations in classical convex exchange economies with L goods, the additional cost relative to veri…cation is roughly L=(N 1) real numbers, which is enough to ensure price taking by each agent, while duplicate announcement of Walrasian price vector as required by Mechanism 1 would require L 1 numbers. However, such additional improvements over Mechanism 1 appear to be possible only in special settings and so we do not pursue them here.
We could alternatively consider the communication cost of only "in-equilibrium"commu- has only Case-(a) Nash equilibria, describing which is the same as describing a budget equilibrium from E. Since the veri…cation lower bound of Lemma 1 also applies to in-equilibrium communication (the oracle can replicate the mechanism using only the message pro…les that are potential Nash equilibria), we see that the in-equilibrium communication cost of onestage Nash implementation of such choice rules exactly equals the communication cost of veri…cation. 13 In contrast, the minimal total size of the agents'message spaces required for Nash implementation may strictly exceed the veri…cation lower bound, as demonstrated by Reichelstein and Reiter [17] .
Multistage Mechanisms
Considering multistage games allows substantial savings in communication. The idea is that while the agents'complete contingent strategies in the extensive-form mechanism must still describe supporting budget sets (as is the case in any veri…cation mechanism), these 13 Note that this conclusion does not hold for monotonic choice rules that are not IM: the communication cost of veri…cation of such rules may be minimized using messages that do not correspond to describing supporting budget sets, while Nash implementation is always a budget equilibrium protocol.
strategies need not be revealed in any single play of the mechanism. Thus, the communication cost of a multistage mechanism can be substantially lower than the cost of its normal-form representation -i.e., the cost of describing the agent's complete contingent strategies in the mechanism.
14 Applying this idea to the revelation of budget sets, we see that a multistage mechanism need not reveal the budget sets in any single play. Instead, it su¢ ces that whenever a candidate equilibrium alternative x is described and then challenged by a single agent proposing
another alternative x 0 , other agents are asked to "approve"the challenge (thus con…rming x 0 to be in the agent's budget set) or "disapprove"it (protest that x 0 is outside his budget set).
Then, while the complete approval strategies contingent on all possible challenges x 0 describe all the budget sets, these strategies and the corresponding budget sets are not revealed in any single play of the mechanism (either in or out of equilibrium).
The tricky part of the construction is restricting the agents to approve su¢ ciently many challenges so that the corresponding budget sets are large enough to verify the choice rule.
(Recall that if the budget sets are too small, the budget equilibrium would not verify the choice rule, and so it would not be implemented by the mechanism. For an extreme example, if agents'strategies disapprove any challenge of a candidate equilibrium outcome x, this yields budget sets B i = fxg for all i, and x is sustained in equilibrium in any state of the world, regardless of whether it is socially desirable.) This is not straightforward to ensure because the whole approval strategies and the corresponding budget sets are not revealed in any play of the mechanism (and so, in general, we cannot verify that the budget set described by the strategies satisfy characterization (1)). We are able to accomplish this for the class of CU choice rules de…ned in Section 2, for which the following observation holds:
Lemma 2 The CU choice rule given by a blocking rule is fully veri…ed with the budget protocol whose message space consists of budget equilibria (B 1 ; :::; B N ; x) 2 2 N X X satisfy- 14 Multistage implementation mechanisms have been previously considered by Moore and Repullo [18] , who used the subgame-perfection re…nement to implement choice rules that are not Nash implementable. Our goal is quite di¤erent since we still consider Nash implementation and use multistage mechanisms to reduce the communication complexity of implementing those choice rules that are Nash implementable. Note also that our Mechanism 2 described below has imperfect information and no proper subgames, and so subgame perfection has no bite in it.
Proof. If (B 1 ; :::; B N ; x) is a budget equilibrium in state R 2 R and satis…es (2), we must
for all T N , and therefore x 2 F (R). Hence, any budget equilibrium satisfying (2) veri…es F . Furthermore, in any state R 2 R for any
, (L (x; R 1 ) ; :::; L (x; R N ) ; x) is a budget equilibrium satisfying (2).
The advantage of condition (2) is that it can be checked one alternative x 0 2 X at a time -namely, by checking that each alternative x 0 belongs to the budget sets of "su¢ ciently many"agents so that each coalition T N satisfying x 0 2 (x; T ) contains an agent whose budget set contains x 0 . We can impose this restriction on an agent's approval strategy
by showing him only the proposed challenge x 0 but not the identity of the challenger, and restricting him to list "su¢ ciently many"agents for whom this challenge should be approved. Just as in the previous section, we do not need the budget sets to be described by all the agents, as long as each agent's budget set is described by other agents. Here, it will su¢ ce to have just three agents describe all the budget sets -i.e., to approve deviations. We need to ensure that in equilibrium the three agents describe exactly the same budget setsi.e., use the same approval strategies. For this purpose, we reward an agent who deviates to an alternative x 0 on whose approval other agents disagree by letting him implement any alternative. Similarly, it su¢ ces for just three agents to describe a candidate equilibrium alternative, as long as any agent is allowed to challenge it. Finally, just as in the previous section, we use the modulo game to make sure that potential equilibria involving a challenge do not yield undesirable outcomes.
Formally, consider the following three-stage mechanism, which has imperfect information:
the only information the agents observe in about each other's previous messages are the 15 Budget equilibria of the form (2) are typically not minimally informative budget equilibria verifying F (and so do not satisfy (1)). We are not concerned about this as we can still use them to construct a low-communication multistage mechanism. Proposition 3 If F is a CU choice rule described by the blocking rule , F satis…es NVP, and N 3, then Mechanism 2 fully Nash implements F .
Proof. We start by describing the agents'complete contingent strategies in the mechanism.
For simplicity, we restrict attention to strategies that do not condition on the agent's own earlier actions. (We can do it because any strategy with such conditioning is equivalent in the normal-form representation of the game to one without it.)
The strategy of each agent i 4 can then be described as l i ; x satisfying (2) (from which we can deduce for
Now the result is proved with the following three claims: The strategies of agents i 2 f1; 2; 3g are feasible because the described budget sets satisfy (2) due to the fact that x 2 F (R). These strategies result in Case (a) and yield outcome x. To see that these strategies form a NE, note that each agent i 2 N can unilaterally change the outcome only by challenging it and going to Case (b-i), in which he can only attain an outcome x 0 2 L (x; R i ).
Claim 2: Each Case-(a) NE in state R 2 R yields an outcome x 2 F (R). . Hence, to have a NE we must have L (x; R r ) = X, thus by NVP x 2 F (R). Xn fxg must belong to exactly one agent's budget set.) Furthermore, any such partitional equilibrium must be used for full veri…cation of F . Indeed, for every partitional equilibrium (B; x) we can …nd a state R 2 P N in which L (x; R i ) = B i for all i, and thus x 2 F (R).
Then (B; x) is a unique partitional equilibrium verifying the desirability of alternative x in state R.
There are XN X 1 partitional equilibria (choose x 2 X, and allocate each of the alternatives in Xn fxg to a budget set). Describing such an equilibrium thus requires log 2 XN X 1 = dlog 2 X + (X 1) log 2 N e bits. As X grows large, this communication cost is asymptotically proportional to X, which is exponentially larger than that of simply naming an alternative (which takes dlog 2 Xe bits). In fact, the communication cost is comparable to that of full revelation of an agent's preferences, which is asymptotically equivalent to log 2 X! X log 2 X bits as X ! 1. By Lemma 1, this communication cost also bounds below the communication complexity of a one-stage mechanism fully Nash implementing F .
Compare this with the two-stage Mechanism 2, whose communication complexity is at most 5 dlog 2 Xe + 4N dlog 2 N e bits -exponentially lower as the number X of alternatives grows. Intuitively, the exponential savings arises because instead of describing budget sets, we simply allocate a given alternative to a budget set in any play of the mechanism.
Continuous Communication: from In…nite-to Finite-Dimensional
Consider the problem of implementing Pareto e¢ ciency with quasilinear preferences in which a unit of a divisible good is to be allocated among the agents, along with the transfers of numeraire. Thus, X = (q; t) : q 2 R N + , t 2 R N : i q i = 1, i t i = 0 where q i 0 is agent i's allocation of the nonmonetary good, and t i is his consumption of numeraire. Thus, X is a 2 (N 1)-dimensional space.
Each agent i's preferences are described by a quasilinear utility function of the form u i (q i ) + t i , where u i can be an arbitrary nondecreasing function. Note that the space of such utility functions is in…nite-dimensional (even if we impose arbitrary smoothness restrictions on the functions, which will not change the arguments). The Pareto e¢ cient allocations (q; t) 2 X in this setting are characterized by maximizing the total surplus P i u i (q i ). Calsamiglia [2] showed that the problem of verifying e¢ ciency in this setting requires in…nite-dimensional communication. Segal [22] rederived the result using the fact that any veri…cation protocol even with two agents must reveal an in…nite-dimensional nonlinear price function [0; 1] ! R for consumption of the good for one agent in terms of the numeraire. This result implies that the one-stage Nash implementation problem also requires in…nite-dimensional communication.
However, for multistage Nash implementation, we can use Mechanism 2, in which only 5 alternatives are described in any play, using a total of 10 (N 1) real numbers (sending bits is "free"relative to the real numbers). Intuitively, instead of describing numeraire prices for all possible allocations of the divisible good, in any (o¤-equilibrium) play of Mechanism 2 the agents'approval strategies only need to describe, for one proposed challenge, which agents can a¤ord this challenge. Thus, we learn only about the prices of at most one nonmoneraty allocation q instead of the prices of all possible allocations, which makes the communication …nite-instead of in…nitely-dimensional.
